Tribal war


"Forget Karl von Clausewitz's dictum that war is a last resort and circumscribed by the methodical actions and requirements of a state and its army. Forget Hugo Grotius's notion that war should be circumscribed by a law of nations."
I am so glad to see that other people understand what is at stake. Robert D. Kaplan has the details.

Because Mr. Shultz and Ms. Dew take tribes seriously, they don't stereotype them. The whole point of this book is that, because each tribal culture is unique, each will fight in its own way; it is a matter of knowing what a culture is truly capable of once it feels itself threatened. Thus the heart of the book is case studies.

The Somali way of war--so startling to U.S. Army Rangers in Mogadishu in 1993--emerged from Somalia's late-19th-century Dervish movement, on which the country's top warlord, Mohammed Farah Aidid, based his strategy. What the West viewed as fanaticism was merely the Somali proclivity for judging a man's character by his religious conviction and his physical ability to fight without limits. In the Somali worldview, our aversion to killing women and children was a weakness that could be exploited by using noncombatants as human shields. Clearly, the task of anticipating the enemy's tactics requires thinking that goes beyond Western moral categories.

There is no better example of how traditional warrior cultures hold fast in the face of globalization than Chechnya, where cowardice is among the worst of transgressions and a dagger the most prized material item. There is in Chechnya, too, as the authors note, the Sufi proclivity for asceticism and mysticism: the former providing the mental discipline for overcoming physical hardships and the latter for sustaining morale. Furthermore, the Chechens' decentralized, clan-based structure--and their tradition of raiding--help to determine their guerrilla style, which has resulted in lethal hit-and-run tactics by small units on large, conventional Russian forces in the "urban canyons" of Grozny.

It's all in the local history. As one Afghan elder said in the early 1800s: "We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, we are content with blood," but "we will never be content with a master." And so, in the late 1900s, an Afghan mujahedeen commander explained why the Soviet Union lost a war: His men intended to fight to the last man, while the Russians didn't.

The whole "science of war" and "art of diplomacy" can't work unless you understand their motivations as well as your own.

That doesn't make other cultures any better or worse than ours, just different. That difference means that a "rational" impulse to compromise will be seen as an admission of weakness and an invitation for attack. Notice how this plays into the American guilt I wrote about a few days ago.

What price are we willing to pay to adhere to our civilized principles?

I do not believe we can allow their victimhood to give them power. It's our guilt that does that.

We are not playing the same game. They won't adhere to our rules unless they have no choice.

— NeoWayland

Posted: Wed - July 19, 2006 at 07:48 AM  Tag


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